Ban the Bomb! Redress the Damage!: The History of the Contentious Politics of Atomic Bomb Sufferers in Japan by Naono, Akiko
“Ban the Bomb! Redress the Damage!”:  
The History of the Contentious Politics of 
Atomic Bomb Sufferers in Japan
Akiko Naono
Contrary to its humanist image, Hidankyo, the Japan Confederation of Atomic and 
Hydrogen Bomb Sufferers Organizations, has engaged in contentious politics against 
the state for decades. This article traces the little-known history of the Hidankyo 
movement from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, introducing how this organization 
formed in relation to the movement to ban nuclear bombs in the mid-1950s and 
how it grew into an independent social movement organization with clear policy 
demands after overcoming an organizational crisis triggered by the Cold War politics 
of the 1960s. The movement slogan for Hidankyo, “no more hibakusha,” did not 
naturally emerge from the sufferers’ experience with the atomic bombings, but was 
substantiated through their struggles to confront their adversaries, most importantly 
the Japanese government.
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Unknown History of Contentious Politics
With the adaptation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in July 
2017 and the subsequent awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the International 
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) in October of the same year, 
hibakusha, a Japanese term literally meaning “the bombed” but often translated 
as “atomic bomb survivors,” have once again come into the spotlight in talks 
on antinuclear activism. As evidenced in the remarks made by the members of 
ICAN, who note that the peace prize is also for the hibakusha, these survivors 
are recognized as the “public conscience” in nuclear disarmament efforts 
(United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 2018, 12). In fact, their national 
organization, the Japan Confederation of Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Sufferers 
Organizations, known as Hidankyo, has been nominated several times for the 
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peace prize for its efforts to “promote the cause of a ban on atomic and hydrogen 
bombs, by making known their sufferings and struggles” (International Peace 
Bureau 2015). As the nominating letter by the International Peace Bureau 
shows, the slogan of Hidankyo’s movement, “no more hibakusha,” has gained 
international recognition. However, its sixty-plus year history is not well known, 
nor is its history of contentious politics against the Japanese state.
Hidankyo, created in the summer of 1956, is the only nationwide social 
movement organization (SMO) of Japanese hibakusha. Since its inception, 
Hidankyo has pledged to stand up against atomic bombs so that the suffering 
experienced by the hibakusha will never be repeated. The principle of “never 
again,” however, should not be taken simply as a humanist message; it is 
inseparable from the hibakusha’s struggles to make the Japanese state redress 
their suffering. In fact, unlike some nuclear disarmament advocacy groups that 
focus on public education, Hidankyo’s endeavor fits perfectly into the definition 
of social movements as contentious politics offered by Sydney Tarrow (2011, 9, 
emphasis in original): “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social 
solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.”
Compared to its relative visibility in nuclear disarmament discourse, there 
has been little academic inquiry into Hidankyo’s endeavors. There are historical 
and sociological studies of the Hidankyo movement, albeit in a limited scope, 
by Japanese scholars such as Ubuki Satoru (1995; 2014), Ishida Tadashi (1986a; 
1986b), Hamatani Masaharu (1977), and Naono Akiko (2011; 2015). Historical 
studies by Tachibana Seiitsu (1996) and James J. Orr (2001) are the only academic 
studies in English that present the movement’s history.
Tachibana introduces the history of Hidankyo quite succinctly and makes 
the important observation that the hibakusha developed their consciousness to 
protest both war and atomic bombs through the realization that war brought 
about the atomic bombings in the first place. Although very brief, Tachibana’s 
study makes an important contribution in English by positioning the Hidankyo 
movement not simply as an anti-nuclear movement but also as a set of efforts 
aimed at the “reestablishment of human rights” (Tachibana 1996, 185).
Unlike Tachibana, Orr is critical not only of the Japanese government but 
also of peace movements in Japan, including the hibakusha movement, because 
he sees them as part of the “ideology of peace” that helped turn the Japanese 
people’s attention away from Japan’s past acts of aggression. Orr presents 
Hidankyo’s main objective as “to obtain better government treatment” or to 
secure the “privileges equal to those accorded veterans” that come with being 
“honored for service to the state” (Orr 2001, 171). However, Hidankyo’s rationale 
for demanding compensation from the state differs significantly from the 
rationales of veterans’ groups.
As noted by Orr, many overlook, or are even ignorant of, the fundamental 
struggle of Hidankyo: to make the Japanese state accept responsibility for 
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the atomic bombing damage as a result of its involvement in World War II. 
Unlike its humanist image, Hidankyo’s history is filled with struggles against its 
adversaries. In fact, Hidankyo had to overcome its adversaries’ attempts to split 
the organization and delegitimize its moral claims.
When it was founded, Hidankyo did not have a firmly fixed set of demands 
against the state, nor was its collective action necessarily contentious. The 
organization’s demands, furthermore, were not clearly articulated in relation 
to the organization’s objective of “no more hibakusha.” It was only through its 
long struggle to overcome many obstacles that Hidankyo was able to strengthen 
solidarity among its members, present its fundamental demands clearly, and 
plead for “no more” with confidence.
By accounting for the little-known history of the Hidankyo movement, 
this article attempts to show how Hidankyo came to engage in contentious 
politics against the state. It focuses on how Hidankyo was created in relation 
to the movement to ban nuclear bombs in the mid-1950s, how it grew as 
an independent SMO in the early 1970s after managing to overcome an 
organizational crisis in the 1960s, and how it became increasingly oppositional to 
the national government throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. While Hidankyo 
is still active today, this article ends with a discussion of the position paper 
released in 1984 since it presents Hidankyo’s organizational objectives in the 
most articulate language and has been considered to be the guiding paper for the 
movement to date. 
This article aims to empirically and theoretically analyze the processes 
through which Hidankyo came to substantiate the slogan “no more hibakusha” 
by negotiating with and confronting its adversaries. Thus, this article fills a 
historiographical gap in the literature, especially in English, on hibakusha and 
peace movements in Japan and presents an alternative account of atomic bomb 
survivors’ struggles for peace. As a historical inquiry, it is based on archival 
research in the movement’s documents, including memoirs of Hidankyo leaders, 
foundational papers, position papers, minutes of executive committee meetings 
and general meetings, newsletters, pamphlets, and petition papers.
The Ban-the-Bomb Movement and the Formation of Hidankyo
The first several years after the atomic bombings were an extremely difficult 
period for the survivors who became sick from unknown and often fatal illnesses 
and lived in severe poverty. Although they were in desperate need of public 
assistance, it was extremely difficult for survivors to organize themselves to 
collectively demand attention from state authorities during the U.S. occupation, 
which censored publications that discussed suffering caused by the atomic 
bombings. Toward the end of the occupation, there were some efforts to organize 
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the survivors. Although these efforts were limited in scope, they provided the 
foundation for a nationwide survivors’ movement to emerge in the mid-1950s 
after a popular movement to ban nuclear bombs was formed in Japan.
In March 1954, the “Lucky Dragon No. 5,” a Japanese tuna-fishing vessel, 
was exposed to radioactive fallout from a U.S. hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll 
in the Pacific Ocean. Upon its return to Japan, the crew of the Lucky Dragon 
showed early symptoms of radiation sickness. After a national newspaper broke 
this news, the Japanese public became aware of the radiological contamination 
of water and fish. Now aware of the threat of radiation to their food, health, and 
livelihood, people from all walks of life formed petition movements calling for 
the prohibition of hydrogen and atomic bomb testing. Regardless of their political 
and ideological positions, most Japanese supported the ban-the-bomb movement, 
and more than twenty million signatures, representing close to 30 percent of the 
total population, were gathered in less than a year after the incident (Hiroshima-
shi 1984, 123).
In the ban-the-bomb discourse, the Lucky Dragon Incident was positioned 
as the third Japanese tragedy caused by nuclear bombs. As a result, the collective 
memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki came to be firmly nationalized in Japan. 
However, that sequence of events did not immediately raise public awareness of 
the sufferers of the two atomic-bombed cities. It was only after the participants 
of the nationwide movement had the opportunity to listen to the voices of the 
sufferers in person at the World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen 
Bombs, held in Hiroshima in the summer of 1955, that the ban-the-bomb 
movement turned its attention to the suffering of the survivors and advocated 
assisting them (Fujiwara 1991, 53-59).
Nevertheless, atomic bomb survivors were greatly encouraged by the 
overwhelming public support for the ban-the-bomb movement, and they formed 
their national organization, Hidankyo, on August 10, 1956, during the Second 
World Conference held in Nagasaki. At their inaugural meeting, Hidankyo 
declared its intention to “save humanity from its crisis through the lessons 
learned from our experiences” (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 
1956b). Hidankyo also announced its present objectives including pushing for 
an international agreement to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs and demanding 
the institutionalization of medical and social assistance measures for the sufferers 
(Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai Nihon Hidankyo-shi Henshū Iin-
kai 2009, 88-89). From its inception, Hidankyo presented what would grow into 
its “two fundamental demands”—the elimination of nuclear weapons and the 
enactment of the Hibakusha Relief Law—as its organizational objectives, albeit in 
relatively unsophisticated language.
Pressured by the popular ban-the-bomb movement and in collaboration 
with the municipal governments of A-bombed cities and the newly formed 
Hidankyo, the government enacted the “Atomic Bomb Medical Law” in 1957, 
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which aimed to maintain and improve “hibakusha’s health with state-sponsored 
check-ups and medical assistance” (Hibakusha Engo Hōrei Kenkyu-kai 2003, 
160). Although this measure was insufficient to alleviate the hibakusha’s health-
related problems or improve their living conditions, it was nonetheless the very 
first state assistance directed at the atomic bomb sufferers.
While building on the preexisting networks of small groups of survivors and 
their supporters, such as the Atomic Bomb Victims Association in Hiroshima 
(formed in August 1952) and the Atomic Bomb Women’s Group in Nagasaki 
(formed in June 1953), sufferers seized “political opportunities” (Tarrow 2011) 
created by the Lucky Dragon Incident and the subsequent ban-the-bomb 
movement to organize themselves into a national organization.1 The Incident not 
only helped raise public awareness of the fatal danger of nuclear bombs but also 
led to positioning Hiroshima and Nagasaki as national symbols of victimization. 
This shift in perception made it easier and more convincing to frame assistance 
for the survivors of the two cities as the obligation of the “only atomic-bombed 
nation.” Moreover, due to the increased public sympathies, funds were raised for 
the survivors to receive health check-ups in several prefectures, such as Nagano, 
Tokyo, Ehime, and Gunma. These check-ups helped the sufferers to find each 
other and organize themselves into regional groups.2 In other cases, such as 
in Kanagawa and Kyoto prefectures, sufferers found each other by attending 
local ban-the-bomb conferences and organized themselves into groups (Ubuki 
1995, 531-533). At its inaugural meeting in 1956, Hidankyo was formed of 
four prefectural organizations in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Ehime, and Nagano, in 
addition to individual sufferers from other parts of Japan. With the increasing 
number of regional groups being formed throughout Japan, Hidankyo would 
truly become a national confederation.3
Public support of the ban-the-bomb movement was the greatest external 
resource for the atomic bomb sufferers, who, as a group, lacked political and 
financial resources compared to veterans and repatriates. When the ban-the-
bomb movement began to turn its energy to ideological battles and lose public 
support, Hidankyo found itself in a difficult position.
Cold War Politics Playing Out in the Ban-the-Bomb Movement
As an SMO emerged from the ban-the-bomb movement, Hidankyo was 
initially a member organization of the Gensuikyo [Japan Council against 
Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs], the umbrella organization of the ban-the-bomb 
movement which was formed after the World Conference in 1955. Hidankyo 
received financial support from Gensuikyo and took part in actions initiated by 
Gensuikyo, such as lobbying politicians and government officials and sending 
delegates across Japan and abroad (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 
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Nihon Hidankyo-shi Henshū Iin-kai 2009, 75-78). However, Hidankyo ultimately 
distanced itself from Gensuikyo and withdrew its membership in the mid-1960s.
Around the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s, Gensuikyo became 
increasingly progressive and began focusing on issues of nuclear armament 
in Japan and at U.S. military bases. As the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security surfaced as a major political issue toward the 
end of the 1950s, Gensuikyo joined as one of the leading organizations in the 
alliance to stop renewal. The renewal of the treaty was understood as a means of 
incorporating the Japanese Self Defense Force into the U.S. nuclear strategy in 
East Asia and of allowing U.S. forces to be permanently stationed on Japanese 
soil, thus exposing Japan to the threat of atomic warfare. While opposition to U.S. 
bases had been expressed since the World Conference in 1955, the U.S.-Japan 
security treaty became a major political concern for Gensuikyo in the late 1950s 
(Hiroshima-shi 1984, 193-198). Gensuikyo became more antagonistic to the 
conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration, which advocated 
for renewing the treaty. As a result, the movement, which initially framed itself 
as “non-political” and “ideologically neutral” to mobilize a wide spectrum of 
the population, became explicitly “political” and antagonistic to the LDP-led 
government.
The LDP had shown support for the World Conference as a way to cater to 
public opinion, but as the Gensuikyo-led movement began to focus its efforts to 
oppose the security treaty, the LDP began maneuvering to weaken Gensuikyo’s 
leadership in the movement. A month before the Fifth World Conference was 
to be held in Hiroshima in 1959, the Hiroshima prefectural council decided to 
cancel its financial support for the Conference following the initiative of its LDP 
members (ibid., 245). Subsequently, other prefectural assemblies, such as Niigata 
and Yamaguchi, also decided to cancel or suspend their financial support to 
the Conference. At the national level, the National Association of Chairpersons 
of Prefectural Assemblies adopted a resolution calling on Gensuikyo to act 
“prudently” (ibid., 247). Despite these conservatives’ efforts to thwart it, the 
World Conference was held in Hiroshima with more than 10,000 participants, 
twice as many as the previous year. Attempts to disrupt it continued during the 
Conference: Hiroshima LDP members distributed flyers with a call to “normalize” 
the Conference, and radical right-wingers physically attacked the participants 
(ibid., 249-254).
LDP members and other conservative elites continued to position 
themselves as the conscience of the ban-the-bomb movement and to isolate the 
leftists from the popular movement. In particular, they attempted to win support 
from hibakusha by endorsing expanded assistance measures. LDP’s Hiroshima 
prefectural charter formed a special committee to legislate assistance measures 
for hibakusha in September 1959 in addition to committees to “normalize” the 
ban-the-bomb movement (Chugoku Shimbun 1959). 
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Conservatives’ attempts to weaken Gensuikyo’s presence in the ban-the-
bomb movement were furthered by the founding of a new ban-the-bomb 
organization. In August 1959, the LDP’s Hiroshima prefectural charter called 
for setting up a “new Gensuikyo” (Chugoku Shimbun-sha 1995, 358). While 
the LDP did not take any further initiative to form a new organization, the 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which was founded in January 1960 by the 
right-wing members of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and the All-Japan Trade 
Union Congress (Zenrō Kaigi), which broke from the General Council of Trade 
Unions of Japan, the JSP’s strong support base, formed the National Council for 
Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons (known as Kakkin Kaigi) in July 1961. The 
LDP was not a board-member organization of Kakkin Kaigi; however, prominent 
members of the party, such as Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobusuke, assumed 
official positions as advisors in Kakkin Kaigi (Shishido 1962, 45).4
Kakkin Kaigi denounced Gensuikyo for its “anti-American and pro-
communist stance” and claimed to be the champion of the humanist approach 
to peace and the banning of nuclear weapons. As an attempt to position itself as 
a humanist organization, Kakkin Kaigi called for promoting relief measures for 
hibakusha (Hiroshima-shi 1984, 272-277).
After the founding of Kakkin Kaigi, more political turmoil was seen in the 
movement; when the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing in September 1961, 
it engendered antagonism between the remaining socialists and communists in 
Gensuikyo. Ultimately, the movement was split into three camps: conservatives, 
socialists, and communists.
The Coming of a Crisis in Hidankyo
Political and ideological disputes in the ban-the-bomb movement were brought 
home to Hidankyo because it was a member organization of Gensuikyo 
and because several of its leaders, such as Moritaki Ichiro and Fujii Heiihi 
in Hiroshima and Kosasa Hachiro in Nagasaki, were active participants of 
Gensuikyo.5 At board meetings in 1959, the positioning of Hidankyo in relation 
to the “politicized” World Conference was a subject of heated debate. Some feared 
that Hidankyo would be labeled radical if it engaged in issues of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Alliance Treaty, and they therefore advocated that Hidankyo concentrate 
on promoting relief for hibakusha (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 
1959a; 1959b). 
Disagreements over the positioning of Hidankyo in relation to the left-
leaning Gensuikyo almost split the organization. While no consensus had been 
reached, the Hyogo prefectural member organization decided to withdraw 
from the Hyogo branch of Gensuikyo in the spring of 1960 (Nihon Gensuibaku 
Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 1960b). At the seventh general meeting held in August 
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1962, a resolution was jointly proposed by eleven prefectural affiliates, including 
Hyogo and Ōita, suggesting that Hidankyo join Kakkin Kaigi if it remained a 
member of Gensuikyo; if not, then it should withdraw from Gensuikyo and not 
be affiliated with any ban-the-bomb organization (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha 
Dantai Kyogi-kai 1962b). Because no consensus was reached, the matter was left 
to the board meeting.
In early September, the board made a decision that Hidankyo would retain 
its organizational membership in Gensuikyo (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai 
Kyogi-kai 1962c). This decision turned out to be unsuccessful in maintaining 
Hidankyo’s organizational unity; a week after the board’s decision, the Ōita 
prefectural member organization decided to withdraw not only from the local 
branch of Gensuikyo but also from Hidankyo. Instead, it joined the newly formed 
National Federation of Hibakusha (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-
kai Nihon Hidankyo-shi Henshū Iin-kai 2009, 103; Itō 1976, 24). Over the next 
few years, heated discussions continued regarding whether the organization 
should maintain its membership in Gensuikyo. At the nineteenth meeting of 
the executive board of regional representatives held in February 1965, the final 
decision was made that Hidankyo would keep its organizational unity but not 
join any particular ban-the-bomb organization (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha 
Dantai Kyogi-kai 1965).
The struggle among competing political camps to win hegemony over the 
popular ban-the-bomb movement certainly reflected the Cold War politics 
of the time. It seems that the conservative elites, who considered the security 
alliance with the United States indispensable to their political dominance, 
ultimately prevailed: the movement split, Gensuikyo lost its popular support, 
and the public turned away from the movement. While Hidankyo had barely 
managed to maintain its organizational unity, the party-line split of the ban-the-
bomb movement was nevertheless a blow. The crisis was triggered, at least to a 
certain extent, by conservative forces that attempted to use relief for hibakusha as 
political leverage to win popular support.
As the only people who have experienced the atomic hell, hibakusha have 
emerged as the voice of conscience for the ban-the-bomb movement. Therefore, 
in trying to appeal to the public, it would benefit the conservatives to separate 
Hidankyo from the influence of Gensuikyo and attract hibakusha to their side. 
In fact, some Hidankyo leaders were alarmed that conservative forces intended 
to weaken Gensuikyo by using relief for hibakusha as leverage to organize an 
alternative ban-the-bomb movement. The conservative forces sought to win 
hibakusha support while positioning the abolition of atomic bombs as a separate 
and secondary issue for hibakusha (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-
kai 1959d; 1960a).6 Some saw the formation of Kakkin Kaigi precisely as a 
conservative attempt to reduce the power of the Gensuikyo-affiliated Hidankyo 
by prioritizing hibakusha relief on its list of organizational objectives. One of 
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the more direct attempts to split Hidankyo, as some noted, was the formation of 
the National Federation of Hibakusha (Zenhikyo) (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha 
Dantai Kyogi-kai 1962a; 1962b).
Zenhikyo was formed in May 1962 as an initiative of conservative politicians 
such as Nitoguri Tsukasa, a prominent LDP politician and a former chairperson 
of the Hiroshima City Council. In April 1961, replacing the mayor, he took the 
post of the president of the Hiroshima City Federation of Hibakusha, formerly 
the Hiroshima City Atomic Bomb Victims Association, which was a prefecture-
wide collectivity of local associations of hibakusha throughout Hiroshima 
(Chugoku Shimbun 1961a). This organization was sponsored by the municipal 
government. It had been founded in 1957 and aimed primarily to inform and 
assist hibakusha in their efforts to receive relief under the Medical Law. As such, 
it was not a hibakusha SMO like Hidankyo. However, reorganization of the City 
Association into the City Federation was a move to distance hibakusha from 
the Hidankyo, which was affiliated with the progressive Gensuikyo. The City 
Federation decided not to cooperate with Gensuikyo’s fund-raising campaign 
in 1961 and accused Gensuikyo of being “politically biased” (Chugoku Shimbun 
1961b). The Federation decided not to receive relief funds from Gensuikyo 
and instead received funds from the newly established Kakkin Kaigi (Chugoku 
Shimbun 1961c). The City Federation then took the initiative to form Zenhikyo 
with some hibakusha from Nagasaki and Shimane in the following year (Chugoku 
Shimbun 1962a).7 Zenhikyo further decided that its organizational objectives 
would not include efforts to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs and instead chose 
to focus on the promotion of medical care and welfare for hibakusha (Chugoku 
Shimbun 1962b). Although its membership and influence were limited, the 
creation of the Zenhikyo forced Hidankyo to take a defensive position.
As an organization composed of sufferers, the group’s symbol of unity 
centered on the atomic bomb experience; as such, it was inevitable that members 
of Hidankyo varied greatly in terms of their social locations and political and 
ideological beliefs. As one of the leaders later reflected, simply sharing the 
experience of having been in Hiroshima or Nagasaki at the time of the bombing 
provides no guarantee of solidarity (Itō 1975, 193). Despite differences in 
members’ opinions and political beliefs, Hidankyo nevertheless managed to hold 
itself together as the only nationwide representative organization of atomic bomb 
sufferers in Japan and never dropped its demand for the government to enact the 
Hibakusha Relief Law, while the conservative Zenhikyo advocated for only the 
improvement of existing assistance measures under the Medical Law. Regardless 
of their positions on the political spectrum, the majority of Hidankyo members 
considered their suffering to have been caused by the atomic bombings that 
occurred as a result of war. The logic of calling on the government to compensate 
sufferers for the damages of the atomic bombings was not yet formulated with 
concrete evidence in the early 1960s, but by the late 1960s it was fine-tuned 
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through efforts to reveal the damage of the bombings and through attempts to 
incorporate legal and welfare experts’ opinions to substantiate the group’s claims.
Challenging the Government’s War Redress Policy
Embroiled in the political disputes of the ban-the-bomb movement, the Hidankyo 
movement stagnated during the first half of the 1960s. However, at the local level, 
efforts were being made to obtain a fuller picture of the sufferers’ plight: some 
collected and published testimonial accounts, while others conducted small-scale 
surveys.8 These small-scale efforts were compiled by social scientists, including 
members of the Hidankyo, and laid the groundwork for an important movement 
document, released in 1966, that would help give the movement direction.
At the time of these efforts to reveal the damage caused by atomic bombings, 
a historic decision was delivered in December 1963 at the Tokyo District Court. 
Five atomic bomb sufferers had filed a suit for damages against the Japanese 
government in 1955 (Matsui 1986, 24, 206-207). The plaintiffs claimed that 
the use of atomic bombs had violated international law and therefore the 
U.S. government should take responsibility for the damages, but since the 
Japanese government had waived claims for damages through the signing of 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japanese government should shoulder the 
responsibility for damages. The court ruled that the dropping of the atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a violation of international law but 
denied the plaintiffs’ legal rights to receive redress from the Japanese state (ibid., 
206-246). Nevertheless, the case was significant in providing legal rationale for 
hibakusha’s demands for state compensation. The court noted that the Japanese 
government, the defendant in this case, should provide “adequate relief ” beyond 
the existing Medical Law. The court suggested that the government had the 
responsibility to compensate the hibakusha’s plight, which “resulted from a war 
that the state initiated by its own authority and responsibility” (ibid.).
The verdict led in the following spring to resolutions in both Houses 
of the National Diet calling for stronger relief to be provided to hibakusha 
(Sangiin 1964; Shūgiin 1964), and the Medical Law was revised the following 
year (Chugoku Shimbun-sha 1995, 563). Pressured by popular support for the 
expansion of hibakusha relief, the Ministry of Health and Welfare announced in 
early 1965 that it would conduct a nationwide survey to investigate the current 
health and living conditions of the hibakusha so that the government could take 
appropriate measures on their behalf (Chugoku Shimbun 1965).
Because it was undergoing organizational turmoil, Hidankyo could not 
immediately seize the opportunity created by the Tokyo District Court verdict. 
However, efforts were made to unify its members, rebuild solidarity, and shift its 
energy from being consumed by internal disputes to formulating well-founded 
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arguments for its demands to the state. In addition to small-scale local efforts to 
reveal the damage caused by the atomic bombs, the Specialist Committee was 
established to draft a theoretically substantiated set of demands that were based 
on the realities of the sufferers’ plight (Itō 1976, 25-26). The committee drafted 
the “Special Quality of Atomic Bomb Damages and Demand for Hibakusha 
Relief Law” (popularly called the “Crane Pamphlet” because the paper crane was 
the pamphlet’s front page design), which they hoped would provide an evidence-
based and legally founded presentation of Hidankyo’s demands.
The Crane Pamphlet outlined the damage in terms of its physical, biological, 
and social aspects, with a special focus on the “vicious circle of developing 
atomic-bombing related illness and falling into poverty.” As indicated by the 
title, the report presented in detail the unique aspects of the suffering caused by 
the atomic bombings by focusing not only on the scale of the bombings but also 
on the lasting effects of radiation. As such, it attempted to distinguish atomic 
bombing damage from other war damage, especially the damage caused by 
incendiary fire bombings. The emphasis placed on the uniqueness of the atomic 
bombing damage, the Specialist Committee hoped, would provide the rationale 
for the enactment of the Hibakusha Relief Law, which the government had 
rejected on the grounds that “preferable treatment” of hibakusha would disrupt 
the balance in treatment of civilian war sufferers.
Presenting the demands of Hidankyo in the language of concrete policy 
proposals for the first time, the Crane Pamphlet urged the government to institute 
a relief law for the atomic bomb sufferers. The proposed act, with thirteen articles, 
was positioned as a special state measure to “compensate war-related damages 
of the citizens, for which the state is responsible.” Referring to the Tokyo District 
Court verdict, the pamphlet outlined three reasons the state should compensate 
the sufferers: (1) the state bears the resultant responsibility to compensate because 
it was primarily responsible for the war and invited the atomic bombings, which 
are illegal under international law; (2) the state abandoned the sufferers for twelve 
years after the bombings; and (3) the state waived its rights to damages from the 
United States. In addition, the Crane Pamphlet pointed to the state’s responsibility 
to provide medical and welfare assistance for its citizens, guaranteed under the 
constitution as the citizens’ rights to well-being. The relief law for the atomic 
bomb sufferers, the pamphlet claimed, is a special state measure that is based on 
the state’s responsibility to compensate war victims and to ensure the welfare of its 
citizens. While emphasizing the state’s responsibility to compensate the sufferers 
by making special reference to the Tokyo District Court verdict several times, the 
Crane Pamphlet nevertheless positioned the proposed act as part of the state’s 
responsibility for social welfare.
Since its formation in 1956, Hidankyo has demanded the enactment of 
a “Relief Law for the Sufferers of the Atomic Bombings,” abbreviated as the 
Hibakusha Relief Law. This law is significantly different in substance from the 
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Medical Law because it includes comprehensive medical treatment and welfare 
measures for all sufferers of the atomic bombings, including bereaved families of 
the victims. Demands were directed to the national government of Japan, not to 
the U.S. government. This decision was made partly because it was understood as 
technically impossible to bring those responsible for dropping the atomic bombs 
to justice, as the Japanese rights to damages had been waived by the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty. In addition to the legal obstacles, Hidankyo targeted the Japanese 
government because its members considered their suffering to be caused by war, 
which was “pursued by the state” (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 
1956a). Hidankyo framed the atomic bombing damages as having been caused 
by the state’s act and argued that those damages therefore ought to be remedied 
by the state. At its early stage, however, the emphasis was placed on the state’s 
responsibility to care for the welfare of the population and not on pinning down 
its war responsibility. The fact that it named its policy proposal a “relief law” 
suggests that Hidankyo took the Relief Law for the War Victims and Survivors 
(hereafter the “Relief Law for the Survivors”) as a policy template.
The Relief Law for the Survivors was legislated immediately after the Allied 
occupation of the Japanese mainland was lifted in April 1952. On the grounds 
of their having had an affiliation with the state, the Relief Law for the Survivors 
provided assistance for veterans, civilian military employees, and their bereaved 
families. The government has insisted that only those who have had a “direct 
employment relationship with the state” were eligible for measures under the act 
(Shūgiin 1957). Special state assistance, the government argued, was provided for 
the former employees of the state based on the same principle as the employer’s 
liability (Shūgiin 1974). By contrast, civilians who had no affiliation with the 
state and those from Japan’s former colonies, who had been stripped of their 
Japanese nationality and were therefore not eligible because the Relief Law had a 
nationality clause, received no assistance (Nihon Bengoshi Rengō-kai 1997, 153-
164).
State war-redress measures were unfair to the civilians who suffered 
considerably from the total war, during which the entire population, including 
the colonies, was mobilized for the war effort. At the same time, the 
institutionalization of compensatory measures for veterans paved a way for 
civilian war sufferers to make their demands. Hidankyo took advantage of this 
opportunity and in presenting its demands followed the model of the Relief 
Law for the Survivors. However, because the Relief Law for the Survivors was 
presented by the state as the reward for those who had sacrificed for the nation 
(Naono 2010), insofar as Hidankyo relied on it as a template for their policy 
demand, they could not effectively pressure the state to redress the suffering 
caused by the atomic bombs.
It would be easier, some believed, to obtain state assistance equivalent 
to that received by veterans by expanding existing government measures. It 
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would therefore be wise to pursue lobbying efforts that were consistent with 
the ideological approach implied in the Relief Law for the Survivors, to drop 
the accusatory tone, and to make secondary the demand to ban nuclear bombs. 
Local politicians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki led by LDP council members and 
groups of bereaved families, especially the parents of deceased junior-high-
school students who were mobilized for war efforts, asked the government for 
condolence money and bereaved family pensions using precisely this line of 
strategy. They argued that their children died for the country, just like soldiers, 
and the state ought to acknowledge their service to the nation (Hiroshima-ken 
Dōingakuto-ra Giseisha no Kai 1975, 86-97).
Through several revisions of the Relief Law for the Survivors, efforts by 
the bereaved families of deceased students were successful in getting their 
demands met by the early 1970s (ibid., 92-96). By contrast, Hidankyo continued 
demanding the enactment of a new state measure despite the conservatives’ 
attempts to destabilize Hidankyo’s position by calling for stronger relief for 
hibakusha through the revision of the existing measures. Hidankyo refused 
to give in to the political and ideological approach of the Relief Law for the 
Survivors and managed to remain united under a call for “no more hibakusha” 
with an implicitly anti-war position. While Hidankyo did not emphasize its 
slogan of “ban the nuclear bombs” in its collective action during the early 1960s, 
that slogan would become clearly indispensable to its demand for “no more 
hibakusha” from the late 1960s to early 1970s.
An Oppositional Turn against the State
Hidankyo became more active in pressuring the national government to 
institutionalize compensatory measures for atomic bomb sufferers from the late 
1960s to early 1970s. While the intellectual leadership of Hidankyo, which mostly 
comprised liberal professors as well as some labor activists, played some role in 
its strategic direction, it was largely the government’s failure to ease the suffering 
of the atomic bomb sufferers, combined with its nuclear and security-related 
policies, that enraged members of Hidankyo and helped them unite under a more 
contentious stance against the government.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare conducted the first nationwide survey 
of hibakusha in late 1965 to provide a basis for more appropriate relief measures. 
The tentative results of the survey findings announced in November 1967 showed 
that more than a few hibakusha still suffered from physical damage, such as 
keloid, and had poor living conditions. However, it was concluded that there was 
no significant difference overall in the health and living conditions of hibakusha 
and other Japanese, and the survey found no apparent negative influence of the 
atomic bombings on the hibakusha population as a whole (Sumiya 1968, 113-
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114). This report enraged many hibakusha and Hidankyo immediately protested 
against the Ministry (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai Nihon 
Hidankyo-shi Henshū Iin-kai 2009, 111-112).
Based on the survey findings, the Special Law for Hibakusha was enacted 
the following spring. This law was a product of the political developments 
since the Tokyo Regional Court verdict in 1963 and of the increasing public 
support for more relief for hibakusha. However, it targeted only hibakusha with 
special conditions, such as those suffering as a result of the bombings who were 
identified in the survey, and therefore was far from meeting Hidankyo’s demands 
for comprehensive relief measures for all sufferers (Sumiya 1968, 113). The 
Special Law was positioned as a special welfare measure, unlike the Relief Law for 
the Survivors, which was considered a compensatory measure (Hibakusha Engo 
Hōrei Kenkyu-kai 2003, 170). The characterization of the Special Law and the 
government refusal to provide hibakusha with state compensation was consistent 
with the government’s position to not compensate civilian war victims.
While recognizing the Special Law as something of an achievement, 
Hidankyo accused the government of straw-manning the issue and renewed 
its commitment to promote the enactment of the Hibakusha Relief Law. At its 
twelfth general meeting held in August 1968, Hidankyo adopted a resolution 
criticizing the government for neglecting its demands while giving compensation 
to a limited group of war suffers, such as veterans, civilian military employees, 
their bereaved, and repatriates (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 
1968). In the campaign plans adopted for the following year, Hidankyo connected 
the government’s refusal to admit its responsibility to provide compensation for 
atomic bombing damages to its underestimation of the damages, with a special 
note on the conclusion of the 1965 hibakusha survey report. Furthermore, it 
condemned, in a strong tone, the Japanese government for promoting security 
policy that relied on nuclear weapons (ibid.).
From the mid- to late-1960s, the conservative LDP administration moved 
to rely more heavily on U.S. nuclear security. The administration allowed U.S. 
nuclear submarines to call at Japanese ports several times beginning in 1964. In 
January 1968, the U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise ported at Sasebo, only 
50 km away from the city of Nagasaki, to take part in the Vietnam War (Chugoku 
Shimbun-sha 1995, 660). These events alarmed many, especially leftist political 
parties and student and peace activists who were concerned Japan would be 
armed with U.S. nuclear weapons and contribute to the intensification of the 
Vietnam War. Faced with strong opposition to the port calls by U.S. warships, 
high-ranking LDP politicians, including the prime minister, urged resolution of 
the “nuclear allergy” of the Japanese public (Arase and Okayasu 1968).
In response to these political developments, Hidankyo severely criticized 
the Japanese government’s attitude. At the general meeting held in the summer 
of 1968, Hidankyo accused the government of underestimating the aftereffects of 
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radiation on hibakusha’s health: 
Denial of the real damage caused by nuclear weapons is linked to [the Japanese 
government’s] attempts to resolve the ‘nuclear allergy.’ [The government] abandoned 
hibakusha for twelve years while following the nuclear offender, never conducted 
a comprehensive damage survey, closed its door to save hibakusha who suffered 
from illness and poverty by denying to attribute their illness to the effects of 
atomic bombings. These acts [of the government] are consistent with [its] denial of 
radioactive contamination [caused by] and the introduction of nuclear weapons [by 
the United States] (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 1968).
Hidankyo expanded its scope of actions after the enactment of the Special 
Law so that a state compensatory measure, not merely a welfare measure, would 
be institutionalized. Hidankyo representatives joined sympathetic scholars who 
were voicing their opinions in favor of the Hibakusha Relief Law at the public 
hearings held by the Committee on Social and Labor Affairs of the House of 
Representatives in July 1969 (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 
Nihon Hidankyo-shi Henshū Iin-kai 2009, 114). Hidankyo engaged in a series 
of lobbying efforts and contentious actions from late 1969 to early 1970, such as 
meeting with members of the Diet and conducting sit-ins in front of memorials 
for the sufferers of the atomic bombings in Tokyo. One of the fruits of this series 
of actions was the formation of a committee within the LDP focused on issues 
concerning hibakusha in November 1970 (ibid., 114-115, 123).
In 1971, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku attended the peace memorial ceremony 
held in Hiroshima on the anniversary of the bombing, making him the first 
prime minister to do so. While pledging to work for peace, the prime minister 
bluntly ruled out the possibility of instituting the Hibakusha Relief Law that 
Hidankyo had demanded (Chugoku Shimbun 1971). This decision outraged many 
hibakusha, and Hidankyo organized a large-scale protest in December in the 
capital city with approximately 1,000 participants from across Japan demanding 
the enactment of the relief law and the return of a nuclear-free Okinawa (Nihon 
Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai Nihon Hidankyo-shi Henshū Iin-kai 
2009, 124).
At the fifteenth general meeting held in 1971, Hidankyo announced the 
“Basic Demands of the Atomic Sufferers.” Building on the thirteen policy 
demands outlined in the Crane Pamphlet, Hidankyo solicited opinions from 
regional organizations across Japan. With the input of the Specialists Committee, 
twenty-six demands were listed and adopted at the general meeting (ibid., 
121). In addition to the state responsibilities for compensation outlined in the 
Crane Pamphlet, the Hibakusha Relief Law was positioned as a pledge from 
the state, as the world’s only A-bombed nation, to its citizens never to create 
another hibakusha. As such, it had implications for Japan’s nuclear policy (Nihon 
Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 1971). Making an explicit reference 
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to state security policy, Hidankyo more clearly articulated the connection 
between its demands for compensation and its call to ban nuclear weapons. In 
the following year, Hidankyo strongly upheld its claims against not only nuclear 
bombs but also war in general (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 
1973).
Building on the twenty-six demand items, Hidankyo announced the 
“Essential Demands Outlined in the Relief Law for Sufferers of the Atomic 
Bombings” (abbreviated as “Essential Demands”) in March 1973. At the time 
of its lobbying efforts in the summer of 1972, the Vice President of the LDP 
remarked that members of the Diet, not the government, should initiate a 
proposal on the Hibakusha Relief Law. Instead of waiting for Diet members to 
draft the law, Hidankyo took the initiative and presented fourteen policy items 
as its “Essential Demands” in April 1973 (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai 
Kyogi-kai Nihon Hidankyo-shi Henshū Iin-kai 2009, 127-128). This list included 
not only comprehensive medical care and welfare measures for hibakusha but 
also condolence money and pensions for the bereaved families.9
Presenting concrete policy proposals, Hidankyo approached both the ruling 
and opposition parties to support its proposal and pressured each party to draft 
its own bill. While the ruling LDP did not present its legislative proposal, four 
opposition parties, Socialist, Communist, Democratic Socialist, and Kōmeitō, 
each announced their own proposals (ibid., 129, 133). Hidankyo encouraged the 
four parties to jointly submit a bill, and although they proposed the Hibakusha 
Relief bill to the National Diet in March 1974, that bill died due to the LDP’s 
opposition (ibid., 135-136, 139-142).
Along with its lobbying efforts, Hidankyo actively engaged in contentious 
politics. To intensify its efforts towards the enactment of the Hibakusha Relief 
Law based on the “Essential Demands,” Hidankyo planned “major actions” in 
1973 and decided to organize a sit-in at the Ministry of Health and Welfare. On 
the first day of the planned actions in November, Hidankyo sent delegates to the 
Ministry, but the ministry officials turned their back to Hidankyo’s demands. 
With this negative response, Hidankyo members set up tents in front of the 
Ministry buildings under rainy weather. This ended after five days of overnight 
sit-ins with more than 3,000 participants, an unprecedented action by an SMO in 
Japan (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 1986, 10). A series of highly 
visible activities successfully won support from opposition parties for legislative 
efforts and a positive response from the Minister of Health and Welfare (ibid.). 
Moreover, by undertaking a series of physically straining but emotionally charged 
activities, participating hibakusha from all parts of Japan strengthened solidarity 
and became conscious of their shared identity as sufferers of the atomic bombings 
(Saitō 1986, 94-106).
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The Endurance Doctrine and the Sufferers’ Fundamental Demands
Hidankyo was increasingly active in the late 1970s. It opened a central counseling 
office in 1976, organized the International NGO Symposium on the Damage and 
Aftereffects of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1977, and 
sent a special delegation of forty-one members to the first United Nations Special 
Session on Disarmament held in New York in 1978 (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha 
Dantai Kyogi-kai Nihon Hidankyo-shi Henshū Iin-kai 2009, 147-148, 159-163, 
165-168). Furthermore, Hidankyo started a new campaign to collect 20 million 
signatures to demand the enactment of the Hibakusha Relief Law in November 
1978 (ibid., 172-175). It was in this context of intensification of the movement’s 
activities that a government-appointed committee overtly rejected its demand in 
late 1980.
The “Committee to Discuss the Basic Issues of the Policy Regarding the 
Atomic Bomb Survivors” (abbreviated as “Committee to Discuss the Basic 
Issues”) was established in 1979 in direct response to a Supreme Court verdict on 
a case filed by Korean hibakusha Son Jin-du (Naono 2010).10 The Supreme Court 
verdict was significant because it acknowledged Japanese state responsibility 
for Mr. Son’s sickness, which the Court considered as having resulted from the 
war—an act of the state. Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected the long-held 
government position that classified relief measures for hibakusha solely as social 
welfare programs and suggested that the Medical Law embodied a spirit of state 
compensation (Hibakusha Engo Hōrei Kenkyu-kai 2003, 895-899).
The verdict pressured the national government to reconsider its policy 
toward hibakusha. Subsequently, in 1979, the Minister of Health and Welfare 
appointed seven specialists to examine existing state measures for hibakusha. 
The final report of this seven-member committee, announced on December 11, 
1980, presented legally bounded arguments because it was directed to offset the 
influence of Mr. Son’s case. Directly referring to the Supreme Court verdict, the 
report acknowledged the laws regarding hibakusha as “a compensatory measure 
in a broad sense, based on resultant responsibility of the state” (ibid., 890-891). 
The report emphasized, however, that the responsibility of the state extends only 
to hibakusha’s unique health problems, which are attributable to the aftereffects 
of radiation (ibid.). Having contained state responsibility for compensating 
hibakusha for their radiation sickness, the report successfully avoided attributing 
any legal accountability of the state to meet hibakusha’s demand. It thus prevented 
rights to state compensation from being extended to other war victims by noting 
hibakusha’s unique vulnerability to radiation-caused illness (Naono 2011, 218-
222).
On the day of its announcement, Hidankyo issued a statement that condemned 
the committee report for “trampling hibakusha’s sincere wish” and for presenting 
a “horrifying justification of war” (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-
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kai 1980). Most enraging for hibakusha was the report’s blatant statement of the 
“endurance doctrine”: “In war, a state of emergency, where the fate of the nation 
is at stake, all members of the nation are obligated to equally accept and endure 
some loss in forms of life, body, and assets resulting from war as its general 
price” (Hibakusha Engo Hōrei Kenkyu-kai 2003, 890). It was in response to this 
doctrine that Hidankyo appealed to the public to recognize the legitimacy of its 
demands by alluding to the spirit of the Japanese Constitution, which renounces 
war.
Not unlike the oppositional turn toward the government in the late 1960s 
to early 1970s, anger triggered by the government’s actions greatly helped to fuel 
the movement in the 1980s. “Can’t endure the suffering caused by the atomic 
bombs” was a slogan that emerged in response to the committee report (Nihon 
Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 2009, 188-190). Hidankyo conducted 
nationwide surveys and substantiated its claim of why such suffering cannot and 
should not be tolerated by anyone. The product of these efforts cumulated in the 
historic document, “No More Hibakusha: Fundamental Demands of the Atomic 
Bomb Sufferers” (hereafter the “Fundamental Demands”) in 1984.
Hidankyo used its two fundamental demands, namely to “ban nuclear 
weapons and enact the Hibakusha Relief Law,” to achieve its wish to never 
create another hibakusha.11 In a morally charged tone, the document presented 
Hidankyo’s demands as relevant to humanity: “Building a fortress to prevent 
humankind from ever repeating this tragedy—we consider this our mission 
imposed by history on those who survived the atomic bombings.” Moreover, 
it framed the Hibakusha Relief Law as a means of preventing the recurrence 
of their suffering and made the Law relevant to the citizens of Japan. Claiming 
that “compensation for the damage is the first step against similar damage,” 
the Fundamental Demands maintained that the legislation of the Hibakusha 
Relief Law would serve as a “proclamation by the state that it would never create 
hibakusha” and would help establish citizens’ “right to reject nuclear war and its 
destruction.”
The reasoning for demanding redress from the state was fine-tuned in the 
Fundamental Demands. At the initial stage of the movement, the state was held 
responsible for providing assistance to its citizens in the spirit of the welfare 
state outlined in the Constitution. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as outlined 
in the Crane Pamphlet and the Essential Demands, Hidankyo emphasized the 
resultant responsibility of the state to compensate the sufferers for the damage. 
Increasingly, in the late 1970s, Hidankyo was clearer in its reasoning for targeting 
the state’s war responsibility, but the decisive move was made by the report issued 
by the Committee to Discuss the Basic Issues, which bluntly told the atomic 
bomb sufferers to accept and endure their plight. It was in its efforts to refute the 
logic presented by the committee that Hidankyo came to regard compensation 
for atomic bombing damages as a way for the Japanese state to take responsibility 
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for the war and to make a commitment never to create another hibakusha.
Historical Implications of the Hidankyo Movement
Hidankyo’s claims and pleas have found resonance among many Japanese, despite 
the group’s sometimes forceful demands and oppositional stance against the 
state, partly because the collective memory of the atomic bombings in Japan, 
the memory that positions Japanese as the victims of war, has helped incite a 
sense of fraternity. Because public support has been the key external resource 
for Hidankyo since the beginning, the group tended to use language that could 
induce a sense of comradeship among the Japanese public or a sense of popular 
nationalism directed against the state to win the public’s endorsement.12 As 
a result, Hidankyo did not actively take up the issue of overseas hibakusha, 
particularly on the Korean Peninsula, until the 1990s. However, it is misleading 
to accuse Hidankyo of having a low regard for Japan’s colonial past or of simply 
being consumed by “victim consciousness,” as some peace activists and left-
leaning intellectuals do. As this article has shown, Hidankyo has struggled to 
challenge the government’s position that war-related loss ought to be endured, 
and it never gave up demanding redress for the suffering due to the atomic 
bombings. In so doing, Hidankyo has pressured the Japanese government to 
admit its war responsibility and atone for the suffering that citizens have been 
forced to endure. In this sense, Hidankyo’s long struggle should be valued, as 
Tachibana (1996, 186) suggests, as a call to turn Japan’s political culture in the 
direction of greater democracy and justice (also see Ishida 1986a; 1986b). 
To this day, the Japanese government has never responded positively to 
Hidankyo’s two fundamental demands to ban the nuclear weapons and enact 
the Hibakusha Relief Law. Instead, the government has insisted on providing no 
compensation so that relief measures for hibakusha cannot be a precedent for 
other civilian war victims, in Japan and abroad, to make demands for redress 
(Naono 2015, 63, 239-240). Nor has the government changed the security policy 
that relies heavily on U.S. nuclear arms; in fact, the current Abe administration 
has moved to rely more heavily on the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” and supports the 
Trump administration’s move to develop “usable” nuclear weapons.
In a less optimistic political environment towards the idea of never creating 
another hibakusha, Hidankyo’s endeavor continues; it demands the government 
compensate for the atomic bombing damages and change its security policy, and 
calls for the international community to ban nuclear weapons. However, as the 
hibakusha population has aged, more than a few Hidankyo-affiliated local groups 
and prefectural organizations of sufferers have been dissolved. It is therefore left 
in our hands to decide which path to take: one with the possibility of creating 
another hibakusha or the one for which Hidankyo has paved the way.
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Notes
1.  The concept of “political opportunity” in the social movement literature emphasizes 
the “resources external to the group” (Tarrow 2011, 33).
2.  In Nagano, for example, twenty-eight sufferers received health checks and formed the 
Nagano Prefectural Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Sufferers’ Organization with six more 
sufferers in 1956 (Ubuki 1995, 553).
3.  By 1966, its membership grew to forty-two prefectural affiliates, and all remaining 
five prefectural organizations were formed and affiliated to Hidankyo by 1985 (Nihon 
Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai Nihon Hidankyo-shi Henshū Iin-kai 2009, 100, 
374-375).
4.  Board-member organizations included right-wing and LDP supporter groups, such 
as Nihon Kensei kai, Fraternity Youth Comrade Association, and Association of Shinto 
Shrines (Kakuheiki Kinshi Heiwa Kensetsu Kokumin Kaigi 1961, 15). Kakkin Kaigi was 
presented as an LDP-affiliated organization in newspaper coverage (Asahi Shimbun 1970; 
Yomiuri Shimbun 1966).
5.  Moritaki was a Hiroshima University professor of philosophy, and Fujii was a local 
welfare commissioner and a prominent member of the Social Welfare Council, whereas 
Kosasa was an independent Nagasaki City council member.
6.  The LDP suggested they would support the relief law for hibakusha if Hidankyo cut 
ties with the Gensuikyo (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyogi-kai 1959c).
7.  Nitoguri was appointed as the president of the Zenhikyo.
8.  The Hyogo prefectural organization published its collection of testimonies in 1962, 
one of the earliest such attempts, and the Shizuoka, Iwate, and Nagano organizations also 
published the results of surveys conducted in their respective areas.
9.  It also included demands for non-Japanese hibakusha to receive equal rights for 
compensation.
10.  Mr. Son, a survivor of Hiroshima, entered Japan “illegally” to receive medical 
treatment for his radiation-related sickness. His condition deteriorated after being 
hospitalized, and Mr. Son applied for a hibakusha health certificate, an official document 
that would recognize him as a hibakusha and make him eligible for medical care under 
the Medical Law. However, he was denied the classification. Attempting to overturn the 
government’s decision, Mr. Son filed a lawsuit in 1972 and won a landmark victory at the 
Supreme Court in 1978 (Nakajima 1998).
11.  The demand to eliminate nuclear weapons was directed at the governments of nuclear 
powers. In addition, Hidankyo demanded “a formal apology” from the United States for 
being the only country to have used atomic bombs and called on the United States to take 
initiatives to eliminate all nuclear weapons.
12.  When Hidankyo became more oppositional to the state in the 1970s and 1980s, it 
often referred to its campaigns as a “national movement” and to the public as the “people 
of Japan.”
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